http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/ch6-erp06.pdf
also
http://fathersmanifesto.net/ch6-erp06.pdf

Pg. 133
Recent
growth in Japan’s net capital outflows has resulted primarily from a
falling
domestic investment rate rather than a higher saving rate. Between
1995 and
2004, Japan’s domestic saving rate fell from 30 percent to 28percent
of
GDP. During this same period, Japan’s domestic investment rate fell from
28
percent to 24 percent of GDP. This widening gap between saving and
investment—Japan’s
excess supply of saving—led to higher net capital
outflows
and a corresponding rise in its current account surplus. Japan’s
current
account surplus rose from 2.1 percent of GDP in 1995 to 2.5 percent
of GDP in
2000 to 3.7 percent of GDP in 2004.
Pg. 134
With $103
billion in net capital outflows, Germany was the world’s second
largest
net capital exporter in 2004. Between 1990 and 2000, Germany
received
total net foreign capital inflows of $175 billion. Between 2001 and
2004, in
contrast, Germany experienced net capital outflows of more than
$200
billion. Germany’s rising net capital outflows
have been mirrored by its
rising
current account surpluses. Between 2001 and 2004, Germany’s current
account
surplus rose from 0.2 percent to 3.8 percent of GDP.
Like Japan,
Germany’s rising saving surpluses and net capital outflows have
stemmed
from a falling rate of domestic investment rather than a rising rate
of
domestic saving. At 21 percent of GDP, Germany’s saving rate has been
broadly
stable over most of the past decade (though it did rise from 2003 to
2004).
Pg. 135
With $69
billion in net outflows, China was the world’s third largest net
capital
exporter in 2004. China’s role as a net capital exporter may seem
surprising
given the large foreign investment inflows it experiences. While
China does
receive substantial foreign investment, it experiences even larger
capital
outflows due to foreign reserve accumulation by its central bank that
results
from its foreign exchange regime. As China’s reserves have risen in
recent
years, its capital account balance has moved toward larger deficits and
its
current account toward larger surpluses. In 2004, China’s current account
surplus
was equivalent to 4 percent of GDP (note that in December 2005,
China
increased the estimate of its 2004 GDP, which is likely to reduce the
size
of this current account surplus relative to GDP). Current projections
indicate
China’s current account surplus is likely to have exceeded 6 percent
of
GDP in 2005.
China’s
reserves have increased due to its rising current account surpluses,
net
private capital inflows, and tightly managed pegged exchange rate system.
China first
adopted its currency peg in 1994, linking its currency (the
renminbi) to the U.S. dollar at a rate of 8.3 renminbi-per-dollar. To maintain
this
peg, China’s central bank has purchased large amounts of foreign
currency
assets in recent years to prevent its currency from appreciating. Even
after
modifying its exchange rate peg in July of 2005, however, (linking the
renminbi to a basket of currencies rather than
the U.S. dollar alone) China’s
foreign
reserves have continued to rise. By the end of 2005, China’s foreign
reserve
level exceeded $800 billion and may rise to $900-$1000 billion by the
end
of 2006. Between 2000 and 2005, China’s foreign reserves increased by
more
than $600 billion.
In terms of
its saving and investment balance, China’s net capital outflows
have
resulted primarily from a rising saving rate. While China’s rate of
domestic
investment has also been rising (projected 46 percent of GDP in
2005 prior
to its GDP revision), its saving rate has risen even more rapidly.
At roughly 52 percent of GDP, China’s saving rate is the highest in the world.